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1

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987),

The trial court granted summary judgment

and the Order of Dismissal was entered on August 18, 1988.
223-25)
1988.

(R.

The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal August 30,
(R. 228-29)
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

plaintiff-appellant required expert medical testimony to support
her claims?
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not apply because of the
absence of a required evidentiary foundation?
3.

Did the trial court properly dismiss claims for

alleged mental trauma?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-appellant Jeanna M. Dalley

("Ms.

Dalley") alleged claims for medical malpractice and mental trauma because of an injury she claims to have suffered during the
course of an elective cesarean section procedure which took
place at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center ("Utah Valley") on
February 5, 1985.
Inc. ("IHC").

Utah Valley is a division of IHC Hospitals,

After the procedure, Ms. Dalley was noted to have

two black marks on her lower right leg, both of which were identified by some witnesses as a burn.

Ms. Dalley said that the

marks had not been present before she entered the operating

room.

Ms. Dalley also alleges that persons in the operating

room smelled burning.
Dr. Howard R. Francis, Ms. Dalley 1 s attending physician, examined the marks one day after the procedure, agreed
that it was a burn, but opined that it was an old injury.

Dr.

Francis wrote:
6 Feb. 85 . . . Does have what appears to be
a 4-5 day old burn rt calf - pt did not know
about it. It is asymptomatic.
See Frances Affidavit at U 6, R. 114.

[Medical Records, p. 22]

Dr. Francis's statement in the medical records is the only
medical evidence in the record which evaluates the burn and the
time of its occurrence.

In his affidavit, Dr. Francis stated:

Based upon my observation of Jeanna Dalley 1 s
leg on February 6, 1985, it is my belief
that the burn was incurred by her prior to
her admission to the hospital.
I am not aware of any instrumentality which
was near the patient's legs during the time
of the surgery in question that could have
caused or resulted in the burn on the patient' s lower right leg.
(R. 114, emphasis added.)
Dr. Gammett, who assisted Dr. Francis, stated by affidavit:
I have no knowledge as to whether the burn
on the patient's lower right leg was incurred prior to hospitalization. In addition, I have no knowledge or reason to believe that the burn was incurred during
Jeanna Dalley's hospitalization.
See also Gammett Affidavit at H 5.
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(R. 118.)

Ms. Dalley offered no medical expert testimony about the time
that the burn had been incurred or what had caused it, relying
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although Ms. Dalley contends that a layman has common
knowledge that a patient should not get burned in an operating
room, that proposition misstates the fundamental problem in this
case:

whether the burn predated the operating room procedure.

Only expert medical testimony could establish the age of the
burn.

The only medical evidence in the record is Dr. Francis's

statements that one day after surgery the burn appeared to be 4
to 5 days old.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply

when the injury in question apparently happened at a time earlier than the events alleged and could have had a variety of causes.

The trial court correctly assessed the need for expert

medical testimony.

Ms. Dalley 1 s failure to establish an eviden-

tiary foundation for res ipsa loquitur and her failure to demonstrate causation justified summary judgment and demonstrate the
doctrine's inapplicability to the facts and to multiple defendants.

Ms. Dalley has left a record bereft of the medical evi-

dence necessary to prove her case.

The trial court correctly

held that mental or emotional trauma damages were not justified.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THIS IS
NOT A RES IPSA LOQUITUR SITUATION
Ms, Dalley correctly acknowledges the need for expert

testimony in medical malpractice cases.

Kim v. Anderson, 610

P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 1980); Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d
40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Swan v.
Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1978).

She incorrectly tries to

except herself from the general rule applicable in the overwhelming majority of situations by arguing that her burn is entitled
to res ipsa loquitur analysis.
Ms. Dalley must establish an evidentiary foundation
comprised of three elements in order to apply res ipsa loquitur.

First, she must show that the accident or injury is of a

type which would not have happened in the ordinary course had
defendant(s) exercised due care.

Second, the instrument or

thing causing the injury must have been under the management or
control of defendant(s) at the time of the accident.

Third, the

accident must have happened irrespective of plaintiff's participation.

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1980).

Ms. Dalley has failed to establish these elements.
A.

Appellant Presented No Foundation to Show that
the Injury Would Not Have Occurred But for the
Negligence of a Defendant.

In the classic res ipsa loquitur cases involving alleged medical malpractice, a piece of medical equipment is left
inside a patient's body.

It takes no expertise to know that the
-4-

item could not get there by any means other than an open wound
or an opening made during a surgical procedure.

Finding the

item in a body cavity lays the evidentiary foundation for at
least one, if not all, of the required elements for res ipsa
loquitur.

Items do not get to the place of injury unless left

during medical procedures; such items are controlled or managed
by medical practitioners and the patient has no control over and
generally can do nothing to remove the offending item.

This

case is significantly different.
Initially, what the trial court correctly perceived is
that an injury to the body's surface, such as a burn on the leg,
can occur from a variety of causes, not limited to some act or
omission which occurred in an operating room.

Ms. Dalley's

example from Prosser and Keeton on Torts of a patient who is
burned by a hot water bottle assumes without stating that the
hot water bottle was the only available source for the burn in
question and that the burn was fresh.
However, in this case, although Ms. Dalley claims her
burn was not present before she went into surgery, she has offered no medical evidence that the burn was fresh or new when
observed.

She asks this Court to assume, without evidence, that

the burn was new and thus could only have occurred in the operating room.

The assumption cannot reasonably be made.

In fact,

Dr. Francis states that the burn could not have occurred during
the surgical procedure and that on the day following surgery the
burn looked like a 4 to 5 day old burn.
-5-

The strong and plausi-

ble inference to be drawn from this record is that the burn did
not originate during the cesarean procedure but came into the
operating room with Ms. Dalley herself.

When an injury might

have resulted from a variety of causes or circumstances and when
the only medical evidence shows that the injury occurred at a
time other than during surgery, the plaintiff cannot rely on res
ipsa loquitur to prove her case.

See Nixdorf.

Ms. Dalley, who wishes to prove negligence by assumption and to slough over the question of causation, must set
forth proof because her assumptions have no foundation in medical fact.

The appellant has the burden to prove negligence and

causation.

An old burn gives no foundation evidence to permit

res ipsa loquitur to apply.
B.

Appellant Must Present Medical Evidence to
Establish When the Burn Occurred.

Whether a burn is fresh or old is a question requiring
medical competence and a medical opinion based on reasonable
medical probability.

Ms. Dalley could not refute her doctor's

opinion by her own allegation.

A lay person such as Ms. Dalley

cannot make that determination and cannot controvert medical
evidence.
She has offered no medical evidence when the burn
occurred; she has only allegations that it might have occurred
when she says.
vits.

Allegations are insufficient to overcome affida-

Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah
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1975).

This is not a res ipsa loquitur case.

Summary judgment

was properly granted to Utah Valley and IHC.
C.

The Appellant Has Identified No Instrument That
Caused Injury and No Management or Control of
Any Instrument.

The second foundation element of res ipsa loquitur
requires the plaintiff to identify an instrument or item which
caused the injury and the defendant or defendants who had control of it.

In the classic terms of negligence, the plaintiff

must prove injury, causation and damage.

The doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur does not depart from these fundamentals but permits certain assumptions only if foundation elements are established.

Ms. Dalley's failure to identify anything that could

have caused the 4 or 5 day old asymptomatic burn and her concommitant failure to show that the unidentified thing was under
the control of any defendant-respondent demonstrate her failure
to show causation.
claim.

Causation is a required element to her

Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262

(Utah App. 1987).

Ms. Dalley f s case simply fails for lack of

foundation, mandating summary judgment.
D.

Ms. Dalley Has Not Established the Third
Foundation Element.

If the trial court had assumed without evidence (1)
that Ms. Dalley had an injury which, with reasonable medical
probability, occurred during surgery and (2) that an identifiable object under the control of some or all of the defendants
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had been its cause, then the Court might have had a basis for
determining the third foundation element, whether the injury
occurred without participation by Ms. Dalley.

However, infer-

ring this element is precluded by the absence of any other foundation element.

Res ipsa loquitur requires more than Ms.

Dalley 1 s assertions that she was injured.

The trial court thus

properly granted summary judgment to Utah Valley and IHC.
II.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR CANNOT BE APPLIED TO
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE.

Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
justify a reversal of the trial court's decision, the alleged
applicability of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants is
irrelevant.

The fact that some states apply res ipsa loquitur

to multiple defendants cannot supersede required foundation
elements before the doctrine can be applied at all.
Ms. Dalley cites Schaffner v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 689, 336 S.E.2d 116 (1985) review denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 578 (1986), which applies
standards different from the Utah law set forth in the Nixdorf
case.

Even under Schaffner, Ms. Dalley has problems of evi-

dence, foundation and logic.
The plaintiff in Schaffner made an evidentiary showing of a key foundation element:

she had, through the deposi-

tion testimony of one of the defendants, established that a
piece of medical equipment used in cauterizing blood vessels had
sparked and misfunctioned during her surgery.
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That same defen-

dant also testified that no grounding plate had been placed
under the plaintiff, although the use of such a plate was part
of the accepted standard of care when the cauterizing equipment
was to be used.
In Schaffner the plaintiff was required to lay a
foundation before the court was able to determine whether the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine accepted in North Carolina could be
applied to multiple defendants.
such evidence.

Ms. Dalley does not offer any

It is illogical to apply a res ipsa loquitur

theory to a group of different defendants in the absence of
medical evidence to establish even the occurrence of the injury
or evidence of what instrumentality led to the injury.
evidence, Ms. Dalley 1 s position has no merit.

Without

Summary judgment

was proper.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ANY CLAIM
FOR MENTAL TRAUMA DAMAGES.

Ms. Dalley leaps to two conclusions based upon her
unsupported assumptions.

The first is that since each of the

defendants was present in the operating room each was negligent
-- a proposition fully refuted because of her failure to establish a res ipsa loquitur foundation -- and then concludes that
she has a valid claim for emotional injuries.

Utah law simply

does not support such a conclusion.
In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 221 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court agreed to recognize the tort of infliction of
emotional distress, adopting the standards set forth in Section
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313, Restatement Second Torts (and explanatory comments) as
the legal standard.
tively.

The Court did not apply the rule retroac-

Ms. Dalley*s claim is not covered by Johnson.
Moreover, the Johnson decision does not assist Ms.

Dalley to carry her evidentiary burden as a plaintiff since she
must still offer some elements of proof if she is to prevail on
any claim in negligence, including a claim for emotional distress.

Unlike this case, Johnson did not involve injuries and

emotional distress in an ambiguous situation in which the plaintiff relied totally on personal allegations and res ipsa loquitur to show physical injury.

Serious and substantial injury had

occurred at a proven time and by a proven instrument:

a truck

had struck and killed a child and injured its parent.

To recov-

er for emotional distress under Johnson, a person must be injured or in the zone of danger as a result of proven negligence.
Although Ms. Dalley was allegedly injured, she has no
proof.

She alleges the injury but certainly has not proven it

to have occurred during surgery or that it was caused by any
action or omission of Utah Valley or IHC.

Before she can claim

damages for some form of emotional trauma which purportedly
arose from the burn on her leg (assuming arguendo that she is
to be permitted to plead the tort from circumstances she claims
occurred some three years before the Johnson decision), she
must show that the burn was caused by some defendant at a time
established by medical testimony.

Even though she may have been

emotionally upset because there was a burn on her leg, she has
-10-

failed to offer evidence to justify a claim for emotional injury
on this record.
Even adopting the more liberal views of the Johnson
case over those in the prior leading decision, Reiser v.
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), which stated the law at the
time Ms. Dalley alleges her injury, Ms. Dalley1s claim for emotional distress has been shown meritless after pretrial proceedings.

The decision granting summary judgment on the emotional

claim, like the decision on the other issues she raised, was
correct and should be affirmed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants-Respondents Utah Valley and IHC respectfully request that the trial court's decision be affirmed and
that they be granted such other and further relief, including
costs and fees, as may be just and proper.
Dated:

February 14, 1989.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

By rni 7feti^^^^
Charles W. Dahlquist II
M. Karlynn Hinman
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY., STATE OF UTAH
*******

JEANNA M. DALLEY,

Case Number:CV 87-206

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL
HOSPITAL, et al. ,
Defendants.
********

This matter is before the court on defendants' motions
for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and all
parties have filed memo of points and authorities in support of
their respective positions. The court having carefully considered
the motions and the accompanying memo, and having heard oral
argument, now enters its:
RULING
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are well taken
and are hereby granted.
The motions are based on two grounds: First the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply here; second, there
is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the
establishment of evidentiary foundation. The elements of the
evidentiary foundation are: (1) the accident was of a kind which,
m

the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the

defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management
and control of the defendant(s) , and (3) the accident happened
irrespective of any participation at the time by plaintiff.
Nixdorf v, Hicken, 612 P.2d 352-53 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed
that plaintiff, nor defendant(s), cannot identify the offending
instrumentality to say nothing of management or control thereof.
In addition, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff
is required to produce expert medical testimony, except in
exceptional cases (of which this may be one if an instrumentality
could be found) to establish that the outcome was more likely the
result of negligence than some other cause. Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987).
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and has
failed to produce expert medical testimony, and since this is not
an exceptional case,

res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Even

assuming the jury would infer negligence by some body, if they
believe that plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the
hospital, the failure to show what instrumentality caused the

burn, and which defendant(s) controlled that instrumentality
would still leave us without any specific culpable party or
parties. Therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur in this
matter is inappropriate.
The failure to show what caused the injury also
precludes maintaining an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress•
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions
for summary judgment are hereby granted.
DATED in Provo, Utah thisj

day of August, 1988.

^GEORGE E.£%ALLIF, JUDGE./

,«^s®
'CF^^"'"-tS

B8BAUG I S P H ^ l T
f.riU'Sr.CUi5*
Charles W. Dahlquist (0798)
Sherene T. Dillon (4820)
KIRTON, McCONKIE <S BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JEANNA M. DALLEY,
O R D E R
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC.
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD R.
FRANCIS, M.D., KENT R.
GAMMETTE, M.D., PROVO OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, and JAMES
P. SOUTHWICK, M.D.,

Civil No. 87-206

Judge George E. Ballif

Defendant.
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the
plaintiff's Motion in Limine having come on for .hearing before
the Honorable George E. Ballif, the plaintiff being represented
by S. Rex Lewis; defendant James P. Southwick, M.D. being
represented by attorney Elizabeth King Brennan; defendants Dr.
Howard R. Francis, M.D. and Kent R. Gammette, M.D. and Provo

Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic being represented by William W.
Barrett; and defendants Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and
IHC Hospitals, Inc. being represented by Charles W. Dahlquist,
II, the Court having heard full argument on the motions pending
and, in addition, having reviewed, in camera, the records of a
subsequent patient at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center whom
the plaintiff had claimed received a burn on the leg in a
similar manner, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant
to the Ruling of the Court dated August 1, 1988, the Motions for
Summary Judgment of each of the defendants is hereby granted,
the plaintiff's Motion in Limine is denied, and this matter is
hereby dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants, the
parties to bear their own respective costs.
DATED this

/^

day of August, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

SORGE^ BALL IF
D i s t r i c t Judge
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